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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant's assertion of jurisdiction is incorrect. As set forth more fully hereafter, 
this Court has no jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal is defective in failing properly 
to designate the order appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 3(d). Accordingly, the appeal 
must be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction. 
Preservation of Issue: Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See Jensen 
v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ffll 5-7, 977 P.2d 474; Kennedy v. New Era 
Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). 
Standard of Review: Original issue. See Jensen, supra. 
2. Whether the district court correctly interpreted the note and trust deed to require 
reconveyance of all trust property upon full payment of the face amount of the loan. 
Preservation of Issue: Raised by cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 23-25, 
70-72.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs post-
judgment motion to amend the complaint. 
Preservation of Issue: Post-judgment motion. (R. 181-83.) 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Atcitty v. Board of Educ, 967 P.2d 
1261, 1264 (Utah App. 1998) (no abuse of discretion in denying amendment of complaint 
after cross-motions for summary judgment). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The jurisdictional issue is determined by Utah R. App. P. 3(d) and cases decided 
thereunder. The reconveyance issue is determined by U.C.A. §§ 57-1-20, -33.1. The 
amendment issue is determined by Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), and cases decided thereunder. 
These rules and statutes are reproduced verbatim in the Addendum, attached hereto. 
(Add. 53-57.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves a dispute over reconveyance of trust property following full 
payment of the debt secured by the property. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that 
reconveyance is not required until a prior, unrelated debt is also paid. (R. 1.) Defendant 
Furstenau filed a motion for summary judgment, demonstrating that the face amount of 
the loan was fully paid and that the unambiguous terms of the note and trust deed require 
reconveyance of all trust property. (R. 25-31, 106-16.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the unambiguous terms of the note require payment of a 
prior, unrelated debt ("Camillo Note") owed by defendant Nebeker. (R. 72-85.) The 
district court granted defendant Furstenau summary judgment, ruling that the 
"unambiguous language" of the note and trust deed set the loan amount at $150,000 and 
requires reconveyance of all trust property upon payment of that amount. The court also 
awarded defendant Furstenau attorney fees and costs. (Ruling, 3/2/00, R. 144-48, Add. 
1.) 
Plaintiff subsequently filed an objection to attorney fees and a Motion for New 
Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 158, 
181.) In one Ruling, the court reduced the amount of attorney fees. (Ruling, 5/24/00, R. 
215-17, Add. 15.) In a subsequent ruling, the court denied plaintiffs motion for new 
trial, reaffirming its initial ruling that the Camillo Note was not secured by the trust deed, 
and that all trust property was therefore required to be reconveyed upon payment of the 
$150,000 face amount of the note and trust deed. (Ruling, 9/21/00, R. 245-48, Add. 21.) 
The court also denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint as "untimely and legally 
insufficient." {Id. at 247.) Plaintiff appeals from the May 24 Ruling on attorney fees, and 
also cites a supposed "September 25, 2000" ruling, which appears to be merely a revised 
draft that was never issued to the parties. (R. 267, 254-58, Add. 31, 26.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs statement of facts refers to supposed negotiations and circumstances 
surrounding the signing of the loan documents that are not properly considered under the 
parol evidence rule. Therefore, such facts are not material to the issues presented. 
Following is a statement of the undisputed material facts. 
On February 1, 1999, defendants Robert Furstenau and Blair Nebeker signed a 
Promissory Note ("Promissory Note") in the face amount of $150,000. The Promissory 
Note was drafted by plaintiffs attorney, Richard Tretheway. The Promissory Note 
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evidences the obligation to repay a business loan extended to defendants by plaintiff, 
Sandra Tretheway, trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust. The Promissory Note recites 
that it is secured by a Deed of Trust. (R. 32, 36-39; Add. 36.)1 
That same day, as part of the same transaction, defendants also signed the 
referenced Deed of Trust ("Trust Deed"). The Trust Deed recites that its purpose is to 
secure "payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof 
in the principal sum of $150,000." (R. 32, 43; Add. 32, 42.) The property conveyed by 
the Trust Deed consists of two separate parcels, one containing an apartment building 
("Apartment Property") and the other containing a gas station ("Gas Station Property") 
(together referred to as the "Trust Property"). The legal descriptions of these two parcels 
are set forth in the "Exhibit A" attached to the Trust Deed. (R. 33, 48; Add. 34, 47.) 
On June 23, 1999, defendants paid to plaintiff the full amount owing on the 
Promissory Note, $151,728 (face amount plus interest), and requested reconveyance of 
the Trust Property. (R. 33, 50; Add. 34, 48.) However, plaintiff subsequently reconveyed 
only the Apartment Property. (R. 33, 52-53; Add. 34, 49.) Plaintiff refused to reconvey 
the Gas Station Property, withholding reconveyance until defendants paid an additional 
$53,400, plus interest and attorney fees, to satisfy a prior, unrelated debt owed to plaintiff 
by defendant Nebeker. This prior debt was supposedly evidenced by a separate note 
1
 Plaintiff asserts, incorrectly, that Nebeker and Furstenau were "partners." (Br. of App. 3.) That 
assertion is immaterial and unsupported in the record. 
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described as the "Camillo Note/9 although plaintiff has provided no copy of the Camillo 
Note, and no copy exists in the record. (R. 2, 7. 33, 87, 127.)2 
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action, seeking a declaration that she is not 
required to reconvey the Gas Station Property until defendants pay an additional $53,400, 
pursuant to the third release provision of the Promissory Note. (R. 1-3.) Defendant 
Furstenau moved for summary judgment, demonstrating that the unambiguous terms of 
the Promissory Note and Trust Deed require reconveyance of all Trust Property upon 
payment of the face amount of the loan. Because the Camillo Note is nowhere mentioned 
in the Trust Deed, the Trust Property cannot be withheld as security for that note. (R. 23, 
27-30, 109-16.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
"unambiguous" language of the Promissory Note required payment of $53,400, in 
addition to the face amount of the Promissory Note, prior to reconveyance of the Gas 
Station Property. (R. 75-85.) 
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant Furstenau. The court 
construed the "unambiguous language" of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed to 
conclude that the third release provision of the Promissory Note merely allows for an 
optional, partial release of Trust Property upon partial payment of the debt. That 
2
 The record does not show, and plaintiff has not bothered to explain, the origin of this supposed prior 
obligation from Nebeker to Tretheway, or how it is secured by the Camillo Note, or who signed the 
Camillo Note, or the legal relationship that connects Tretheway to Nebeker and Camillo. Plaintiffs 
entire claim is based only on a vague reference to the Camillo Note in the third release provision of the 
Promissory Note, as discussed hereafter. However, the Camillo Note is nowhere mentioned in the Trust 
Deed. Rather, the Camillo Note was apparently secured by separate property described as Lot 16, 
Taylorsville Park Subdivision. (R. 33, 57, 61, 73.) 
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provision has no application when the debt is paid in full. (Ruling, 3/2/00, R. 144; Add. 
1.) The secured debt is $150,000, and plaintiff cannot re-write the Trust Deed as securing 
a debt of $203,400. Accordingly, the court ordered reconveyance of the Gas Station 
Property and awarded costs and attorney fees to defendant Furstenau. {Id. at 146-47.) 
The court initially entered a Final Judgment incorporating its Ruling of March 2. 
(R. 154; Add. 7.) Plaintiff filed a subsequent objection, going only to the amount of 
attorney fees and the wording of the reconveyance order. (R. 158.) In response, the court 
set aside its judgment and granted an Amended Final Judgment, reducing the fees 
awarded but rejecting any other change. (Ruling, 5/24/00, R. 215; Add. 15.) The 
Amended Final Judgment, while filed and "entered" by the court, is not signed by the 
court. (R. 177; Add. 11.) 
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for New Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the 
Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 181.) Treating the motion for new trial as a motion 
to reconsider, the district court reaffirmed its Ruling of March 2. The court held that 
there are no material issues of fact. Rather, the central question of whether the Camillo 
Note is secured by the Trust Deed is a legal question decided on "the plain language of 
the documents involved, without regard to extrinsic evidence." (Ruling, 9/21/00, R. 246; 
Add. 22.) The court concluded that because the Promissory Note and Trust Deed require 
reconveyance of all Trust Property upon repayment of $150,000, defendant Furstenau is 
entitled to summary judgment. {Id. at 246-47.) The court denied the motion to amend the 
complaint as untimely because it was filed after the court had already decided the case by 
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summary judgment. In addition, the proposed amendment to add a reformation claim is 
"legally insufficient" because there is no evidence of mutual mistake. (Id. at 247.) 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 23, 2000, appealing specifically from 
the May 24 Ruling on attorney fees, and from a supposed ruling on September 25, 2000. 
(R. 267; Add. 31.) However, the supposed September 25 ruling (R. 254), filed in the 
record with other drafts and notes of the court (R. 259-64), appears to be only a revised 
draft of the court's actual Ruling issued on September 21 (R. 245). As shown by the 
blank mailing certificate, which plaintiff failed to include in the addendum to her brief, 
the September 25 draft ruling was never issued to the parties. (R. 258; Add. 30.) 
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal makes no reference to the district court's actual final Ruling 
of September 21, which disposed of the motion for new trial. (R. 267.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court lacks jurisdiction of the appeal because plaintiff failed to designate the 
order appealed from in her Notice of AppeaL as required by law. This case involves four 
different court rulings, two final judgments, two post-judgment motions, and two notices 
of appeal. Plaintiffs second Notice of Appeal refers to one non-final ruling pertaining to 
attorney fees and to an invalid draft ruling that was never issued to the parties. The 
Notice of Appeal does not refer specifically to any final, appealable order. Appellee is 
entitled to know specifically which judgment or ruling is being appealed. Plaintiffs 
failure to comply with this jurisdictional requirement prejudiced appellee by precluding a 
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cross-appeal and forcing appellee to incur the expense of analyzing all rulings and 
judgments to determine jurisdiction and formulate defenses to the appeal. 
Plaintiff wrongfully withheld Trust Property after the loan secured by the property 
was fully paid. Under Utah law, trust property may be held only as security for the 
obligation for which it was conveyed. Upon payment of the obligation, the trust property 
must be reconveyed. The unambiguous terms of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed set 
the principal amount of the loan at $150,000 and require release of all Trust Property 
upon payment of that amount. The Gas Station Property cannot be withheld as security 
for the Camillo Note because the Trust Deed nowhere mentions that note, and the 
Promissory Note does not require payment of $53,400 in addition to the principal sum of 
$150,000. Moreover, extrinsic evidence cannot be considered to alter the plain terms of 
the loan documents. 
The district court was within its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend 
the complaint to add a reformation claim. The motion was untimely because the court 
had already decided all legal issues by summary judgment, and plaintiff had no good 
reason for not raising the claim sooner. The proposed amendment was also legally 
insufficient because it was based on a supposed mutual mistake regarding security for the 
Camillo Note. However, because defendant Furstenau did not share in that "mistake," it 
cannot be considered "mutual" so as to justify reformation. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE NOTICE 
OF APPEAL FAILS PROPERLY TO DESIGNATE THE ORDER 
APPEALED FROM. 
Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P., states that "the notice of appeal.. . shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." This requirement is jurisdictional. 
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ^ j 7, 977 P.2d 474. The purpose of 
the requirement is "to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a 
specific judgment in a particular case. Respondent is entitled to know specifically which 
judgment is being appealed." Id. (emp. added). For example, in Jensen, the notice of 
appeal referred to the jury verdict and a ruling denying post-judgment motions; it failed to 
refer to the order or final judgment granting partial summary judgment. Id. \ 6. 
Accordingly, the court held that it did "not have jurisdiction to review . . . claims relating 
to the partial summary judgment." Id. f^ 9. 
Similarly, in Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798 (Utah 1964), the 
notice of appeal referred to a void judgment disposing of a late motion for new trial, 
instead of citing the original judgment. The court noted the resulting problem of 
determining "which judgment is final and which is being appealed." Id. at 800. Because 
the court entered more than one judgment, the date of judgment cited in the notice of 
appeal "becomes material" in allowing the respondent to defend the appeal. Id. The 
court dismissed the appeal because the notice of appeal did not cite the actual final 
judgment. A/, at 801. See also Sierra Nevada MM Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co.* 156P.943, 
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945-46 (Utah 1916) (appeal dismissed for failure to identify the final judgment in the 
notice of appeal; "the notice of appeal should itself so sufficiently describe and identify 
the judgment appealed from as to show what was intended without resorting to the 
pleadings . . . or to cause hunting in and leafing of the record for another judgment"); 
Allen v Garner, 143 P. 228, 231-32 (Utah 1914) (notice of appeal was "defective" and 
"void" in failing to refer to the actual final judgment). 
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal refers to rulings dated May 24 and September 25, 
2000 (R. 267); however, a review of the complex chronology of proceedings in the 
district court demonstrates that neither of those rulings is appealable. The notice does not 
refer specifically to any ruling that is appealable. 
On March 2, 2000, the court entered its Ruling granting Furstenau summary 
judgment, with attorney fees and costs, and denying plaintiffs cross-motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 144.) On March 22, the court entered a Final Judgment on that Ruling. 
(R. 154.) On March 27, plaintiff filed an Objection to Attorney Fees and Filing of Final 
Judgment, challenging only the amount of attorney fees and the judgment's reference to 
the Trust Deed as "void" in ordering full reconve\ ance. (R. 158.) Defense counsel 
conceded the discrepancy in attorney fees and filed a corrected affidavit. (R. 161.) On 
April 12, plaintiff also filed a Motion for New Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the 
Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 181.) 
Treating plaintiffs March 27 objection as a timely motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, the court entered a Ruling, dated May 24, setting aside its Final Judgment and 
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entering an Amended Final Judgment with the corrected total for attorney fees. (R. 215.) 
No other change was made. While the Amended Final Judgment is unsigned (R. 177-79), 
the May 24 Ruling also recites that it stands as the Order of the Court, making entry of an 
additional judgment unnecessary (R. 217). 
On June 21, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the May 24 Ruling. (R. 228.) 
However, plaintiffs motion for new trial or amendment remained pending. While the 
motion for new trial was untimely with respect to the original Final Judgment, the court's 
setting aside of that judgment and entry of an Amended Final Judgment rendered the 
motion for new trial timely. See Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 
1999) (post-judgment motion filed more than 10 days after judgment but prior to 
amended judgment is timely). However, because the May 24 Ruling did not dispose of 
the pending motion for new trial, that Ruling did not constitute a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal. Therefore, plaintiffs premature Notice of Appeal from the May 24 
Ruling is ineffective. Id. at 1054 (the pending motion "suspends the finality" of the 
amended judgment and "renders the notice of appeal ineffective"); Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
The district court finally disposed of the pending motions in its Ruling of 
September 21. (R. 245.) The court denied the motion to reconsider its summary 
judgment Ruling of March 2, stating that it "remains convinced of the correctness of this 
decision." (R. 246.) The court denied the proposed amended complaint as "untimely and 
legally insufficient." (R. 247.) The court concluded that this "Memorandum Decision 
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will stand as the Order of the Court," and that no further order would be necessary. (R. 
248.) 
On September 25, the court signed another draft of the same Ruling it had entered 
on September 21, simply rephrasing one sentence on page 3 for clarity, without affecting 
the substance of the Ruling. (R. 254.) This draft ruling, which bears a filing date of 
October 4, appears in the record with other draft pages and notes of the court, and the 
mailing certificate is blank. (R. 258.) Accordingly, the September 25 draft is not, and 
was not intended to be, the actual ruling of the court, and was never issued to the parties. 
Even if the September 25 draft ruling had been properly entered and issued as an 
amended ruling of the court, it would not be an appealable order because it did "not 
chang[e] the substance or character of the judgment"; rather, it would be merely a 
"belated," "nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment was 
entered," without altering the judgment or the time for appeal. Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1994). 
Accordingly, plaintiffs Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional^ defective in failing to 
refer to any final, appealable order. The May 24 Ruling is not a final order because the 
motion for new trial was still pending. Even as a nonfmal order, the scope of the Ruling 
is limited to attorney fees and a reference to the Trust Deed as "void," neither of which is 
challenged on this appeal. The Ruling does not go to the merits of the original summary 
judgment ruling. The May 24 Ruling purports to "enter" an Amended Final Judgment, 
but that judgment was never signed; therefore, it was not properly "entered." Utah R. 
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Civ. P. 58A(c). In short, the May 24 Ruling presents no basis for appeal, and the 
September 25 draft ruling is not a valid appealable order. Only the Ruling of September 
21, which is not cited in the Notice of Appeal, is final and appealable on the merits of the 
summary judgment and motion to amend, the two issues on appeal. Thus, plaintiffs 
Notice of Appeal plainly fails to "designate the judgment. . . appealed from." Utah R. 
App. P. 3(d). 
Moreover, plaintiffs failure to designate an appealable judgment in the Notice of 
Appeal is prejudicial to defendant. In a case like the present, with complex procedural 
turns, including four different court rulings, two post-judgment motions, original and 
amended judgments, and two notices of appeal, specific designation of the appealed 
judgment "becomes material." Nunley, supra, at 800. Defendant is prejudiced in being 
required to expend several hours of attorney time "hunting in and leafing [through] the 
record for another [appealable] judgment." Sierra Nevada Mill Co., supra, at 946. The 
[Respondent is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed," not only 
to defend the appeal on the merits, but to determine and challenge the assertion of 
appellate jurisdiction. Jensen, supra, at 476 (emp. added). Without knowing which of 
several rulings is being challenged, and which provides the basis for appellate 
jurisdiction, the appellee is placed at a disadvantage in determining whether jurisdiction 
exists. The result is that every ruling must be examined as a possible basis for 
jurisdiction, thereby escalating the cost of defending the appeal. The appellate rules 
specifically place the burden of designating the challenged judgment and defining the 
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basis for jurisdiction on the appellant. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) and (d), 9(c)(l)-(2), 24(a)(4). 
By submitting a notice of appeal that fails to designate the appealed judgment, or that 
generally refers to "all rulings'' of the court, the appellant unfairly shifts that burden and 
expense to the appellee. Because plaintiffs Notice of Appeal fails to comply with the 
basic jurisdictional requirement of Rule 3(d), the appeal must be dismissed. Jensen and 
Nunley, supra? 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED TO REQUIRE 
RECONVEYANCE OF ALL TRUST PROPERTY UPON 
REPAYMENT OF THE FACE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN. 
The parties do not dispute the standard of review, governing legal principles, or 
rules for construction of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed. However, they do dispute 
the legal interpretation of those documents, as plaintiffs interpretation would nullify the 
purpose and terms of the Trust Deed. Defendant also challenges plaintiffs belated 
attempt to rely on extrinsic evidence for interpretation of the documents. 
A, Law Governing Reconveyance of Trust Property. 
The use and operation of trust deeds is governed by statute. Section 57-1-20 
provides that real property may be transferred in trust "to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor." The trustee holds the trust property only "as security for the 
3
 The additional prejudice identified in Jensen, of precluding a cross-appeal, is also present here. 
1999 UT 10, ^  8. Upon receiving the Notice of Appeal and seeing that the only valid ruling cited was the 
May 24 Ruling, defendant was reasonably justified in concluding that the appeal would be limited to the 
issue of attorney fees. Had plaintiff cited the September 21 Ruling, dealing with the merits of the 
summary judgment motions, defendant could have cross-appealed the court's denial of damages under 
57-1-38(3) for wrongful retention of trust property following payment of the loan. 
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obligation . . . for which the trust property is conveyed." Id. As set forth in section 57-1-
33.1(l)(a), when the obligation is satisfied, the trustee is required to reconvey the trust 
property: 
When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property. [Emp. added.] 
Accordingly, the trustee may hold the trust property only as security for the debt for 
which the property is conveyed. Once that debt is satisfied, reconveyance of the trust 
property is mandatory. The trustee may not retain the trust property as security for a 
different debt. 
This well-established principle is illustrated in the case of Hector} Inc. v. United 
Savings and Loan Ass 'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). There, a developer executed a note 
and trust deed to secure payment of a construction loan. The developer also obtained an 
unsecured improvement bond from the lender's affiliate. After the construction loan was 
fully repaid, the lender refused to reconvey a portion of the trust property until the city 
released the improvement bond, which was being held to ensure completion of off-site 
improvements. The Utah Supreme Court held that the lender breached its statutory duty 
to reconvey the entire trust property upon repayment of the secured loan. 
Construing the predecessor of section 57-1-33.1, quoted above, the Hector court 
explained that the statute serves the "purpose of protecting borrowers who secure their 
debt by an interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to return the security when the 
debt is discharged." 741 P.2d at 545. The court continued: 
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The statutes hold lenders to a high degree of care and promptness in 
clearing title to a borrower's property when the debt is paid since the lender 
no longer has a legitimate interest in the security and the borrower has 
great interest in freeing the property of the security interest. [Id., emp. 
added.] 
The court held that the lender's retention of the trust property "to secure a different 
obligation" manifested bad faith: "United9s use of the leverage of refusing to reconvey the 
land securing the trust deed to obtain security for another debt is not good faith by any 
reckoning." Id. (emp. added). "Withholding performance under one contract to compel a 
contracting party to do an act with respect to another independent contract is not good 
faith." Id. The lender had no legal right to force the developer to provide security for the 
improvement bond. Id. The court concluded that by refusing to reconvey the entire trust 
property upon payment of the underlying debt, the lender "unequivocably breached its 
statutory obligation and had no good faith excuse to justify its breach." Id. at 546. See 
also Swaner v. Union Mortgage Co., 105 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Utah 1940) (lender 
wrongfully refused to release mortgage in attempt to compel payment of unsecured loan 
costs); Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah App. 1994) (repair 
shop wrongfully withheld repaired tractor as security for payment of other amounts due 
on open account). 
Based on the foregoing statutes and case law, plaintiff breached its statutory and 
contractual duty to reconvey the entire trust property upon payment of the secured debt. 
As demonstrated below, plaintiff had no right to withhold the Gas Station Property as 
security for payment of an unrelated prior debt. 
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B. Terms and Construction of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed. 
The first and foremost rule of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of 
the parties from the four corners of the document. The purpose of this rule is "to preserve 
the sanctity of written instruments." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 
(Utah 1981). "It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an 
objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may be had 
to the use of extrinsic evidence." Id. at 1062 (emp. added). Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law. Wade v. StangU 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
However, a provision is not necessarily ambiguous simply because the parties offer 
differing interpretations. Gate City Federal Savings and Loan v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117, 
1120 (Utah App. 1991). If the contract is subject to an "objective and reasonable 
interpretation" on its face, the court should not resort to consideration of extrinsic 
evidence. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, supra, at 1062 (trial court erred in considering 
extrinsic evidence of the meaning of a promissory note). See also Interwest Construction 
v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996) (court must look first to the four corners of 
the contract to determine both intent and the existence of ambiguity); Trolley Square 
Assoc, v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994) (contract need not be a "model of 
clarity" to permit construction without resort to extrinsic evidence). 
Another "well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to 
construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the 
agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) (holding that seller of 
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land wrongfully refused to release mortgage upon payment of purchase price). It is 
"settled law that a contract will be construed against the drafter." Parks Enterprises v. 
New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982). "'In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from 
whom a writing otherwise proceeds/" Jones Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 
923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 
(1981). Here, plaintiff concedes that the Promissory Note was drafted by her attorney, 
Richard L. Tretheway. Accordingly, this Court should resolve any uncertainty between 
reasonable interpretations of the Promissory Note against plaintiff. 
Examination of the terms of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, under the 
foregoing principles, demonstrates that the secured debt was $150,000, and no more. The 
heading of the Promissory Note states that it is secured by the Trust Deed. (Add. 36.) 
The next line recites the face "Amount: $150,000.00." Further on the first page, under 
Borrower's Promise, is the recitation that borrowers "have received of $150,000.00 (this 
amount will be called 'principal'),... BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the 
principal amount of the loan." (Id.) Thus, the Promissory Note is not in the principal 
amount of $150,000plus $53,400, or in the total amount of $203,400, as argued by 
plaintiff. The "principal" is plainly defined as $150,000, and the borrowers specifically 
promise to repay "the principal amount of the loan," no more. 
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The Trust Deed is perfectly consistent with the Promissory Note, reciting that it is 
provided 'Tor the Purpose of Securing: (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a 
promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of$150,000.00" (Add. 42, 
emp. added.) No other debt is mentioned; the Camillo Note is not mentioned. The Trust 
Deed goes on to state that it may also secure "additional loans as hereafter may be made 
to Trustor," but only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they 
are secured by this Deed of Trust" {Id,, emp. added.) The Camillo Note was not made 
"hereafter," but predated the Trust Deed, and no evidence has been presented that the 
Camillo Note recites that it is secured by this Trust Deed. Accordingly, the Trust Deed 
secures payment of only the "principal sum of $150,000.00," no more. 
Regarding the Trust Property, the Trust Deed recites that it conveys to the trustee 
the property described in "Exhibit'A' attached and made a part hereof." (Add. 47.) The 
attached Exhibit A describes, on the same page, first the Apartment Property and below 
that the Gas Station Property. By the terms of the documents, and as required by section 
57-1-33.1, plaintiff is required to reconvey all Trust Property, both parcels, upon payment 
of the $150,000 principal amount of the Promissory Note. Nowhere does the Trust Deed 
authorize the trustee to retain any portion of the Trust Property following full payment of 
the face amount of the loan. 
Plaintiff relies on the release provisions of the Promissory Note to justify retention 
of the Gas Station Property to secure payment of the Camillo Note; however, that position 
is strained and unsupported by the language of the documents. The first release provision 
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allows for release of individual apartments for each payment of $20,000. (Add. 38.) The 
second release provision states that upon payment of the full $150,000, the Trust Deed 
property in Exhibit A "shall be released." {Id.) Plaintiff interprets this to mean the 
Exhibit A attached to the Promissory Note. (Br. of App. 10.) However, unlike the first 
release provision, which does refer to the Exhibit A "attached hereto," the second 
provision refers to the Exhibit A to the "Trust Deed." The Exhibit A attached to the 
Promissory Note is not a "Trust Deed," but a "Warranty Deed," with no legal description 
of any property at all. (Add. 40.) Accordingly, the second release provision can only 
refer to the Trust Deed Exhibit A, which includes the legal descriptions of both parcels of 
Trust Property. This interpretation is consistent with the terms of the Trust Deed, 
discussed above, which recite that the Trust Property secures payment of a debt "in the 
principal sum of $150,000.00." Upon payment of that sum, the full Trust Property would 
naturally be released. 
The third release provision does not alter that interpretation. It states that "the 
property described in Exhibit 'B ' attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the 
sum of $53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the Camillo note." (Add. 38, 
emp. added.) The Exhibit B attached to the Promissory Note is a legal description of the 
Gas Station Property. Accordingly, the Gas Station Property would be released upon the 
partial loan payment of $53,400. This third provision nowhere states that the $53,400 
was to be paid in addition to the $150,000 principal sum of the Promissory Note. 
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Because defendants chose the second release provision, paying off the full amount of the 
loan for release of all Trust Property, this third release provision never came into play. 
Accordingly, the three release provisions in the Promissory Note are in complete 
harmony with the other terms of the Note and Trust Deed. The release provisions provide 
alternative options to pay off the loan and recover the corresponding Trust Property. 
Defendants could either recover individual apartments through payments of $20,000, 
recover the gas station through a payment of $53,400, or recover both the Apartment and 
Gas Station Properties through payment of the full $150,000. Because defendants chose 
the full-payment option, release options one and three do not apply. Because the 
"principal" or face amount of the loan was fully paid, plaintiff cannot withhold part of the 
Trust Property to secure an additional payment for the Camillo Note. Absent a clear 
agreement, security given for one debt cannot be enforced as security for a different debt. 
See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952, 957 (Utah 1980); Stockyards Nat. 
Bank v. Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 441 P.2d 301, 303 (Kan. 1968). Trust property may be 
held only "as security for the obligation . . . for which the trust property is conveyed." 
U.C.A. § 57-1-20. When that obligation is paid, retention of the trust property to secure a 
different debt is manifestly bad faith. Hector, Inc., supra, 741 P.2d at 545. Therefore, 
defendant Furstenau is entitled to immediate reconveyance of the Gas Station Property. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that, while the language of the Promissory Note is "precise 
and unambiguous" (Br. of App. 11), this Court should find it "ambiguous" if necessary to 
reverse the district court {id. at 13). While thus straddling both sides of the fence, 
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plaintiff relies on the affidavit of defendant Nebeker to support her interpretation of the 
loan documents. (Id. at 12.) However, as shown above, resort to extrinsic evidence is 
forbidden unless the court first finds, as a matter of law, that the documents are 
ambiguous. Utah Valley Bank, supra, 636 P.2d at 1061; Interwest Construction, supra, 
923 P.2d at 1359. Because the Promissory Note and Trust Deed can be reconciled with 
an "objective and reasonable interpretation," they are not ambiguous. Utah Valley Bank, 
supra, at 1062. In fact, throughout the proceedings in the district court, plaintiff insisted 
that the documents were "clear" and "unambiguous." (R. 77, 79, 81-82, 84, 122-23.) In 
responding to Furstenau's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff identified no material 
issue of fact, but instead urged the absence of a material fact dispute in support of her 
own cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 70-75, 84-85.) The district court agreed 
that resort to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary because the terms of the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed are "clear and unambiguous." (R. 146,246.) The court "looked 
strictly to the plain language of the documents involved, without regard to extrinsic 
evidence." (R. 246.) Accordingly, plaintiff may not now resort to extrinsic evidence to 
obtain an interpretation of the documents contrary to their plain terms. 
POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff argues that because she did not expect the district court to interpret the 
loan documents contrary to her position, the court should have allowed her to amend the 
complaint to request reformation of the documents consistent with her interpretation. (Br, 
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of App. 13-14.) In other words, because the documents do not support her position, the 
court should have re-written them, after the fact, to conform with her position. This 
argument borders on the frivolous, and the district court properly rejected the motion to 
amend as untimely and legally insufficient. (Add.23 .) 
Under Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P., a motion to amend the complaint is addressed 
to the discretion of the district court. The court's decision may not be reversed except for 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Atcitty v. Board of Educ.^ 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah App. 
1998). In considering a motion to amend the complaint, Utah courts consider three 
factors: 1) timeliness of the motion; 2) justification for delay; and 3) resulting prejudice to 
the opposing party. Id. These factors require denial of the motion. 
A motion to amend the complaint to add a new claim after the case has already 
been decided on summary judgment is generally considered untimely and prejudicial. 
For example, in Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994), the parents of a child 
injured by a dog sued the dog owner under a theory of strict liability. After the court 
denied the claim on summary judgment, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to 
allege common law negligence. The court denied the amendment, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, concluding that the motion was untimely, and the plaintiffs presented no 
justification for not asserting the negligence claim earlier. Id. at 922. On similar facts in 
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1991), the court denied a motion to 
amend the complaint to assert a new claim after summary judgment because the motion 
was untimely and "would almost certainly be prejudicial" to the opposing party. Id. at 
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1189. See also Atcitty, supra, at 1264 (denying motion to amend complaint filed after a 
motion for summary judgment); Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Utah 
App. 1992) (denying motion to amend complaint filed in response to summary judgment 
motion). 
Based on these authorities, the motion here was properly denied as untimely 
because the court had already disposed of the entire case, deciding all legal issues raised 
in the cross-motions for summary judgment. If a plaintiff could simply amend the 
complaint to assert new legal theories after the case is decided unfavorably, there would 
be no end to litigation. To avoid wasteful piecemeal litigation, a plaintiff must be 
expected to raise all viable legal theories before dispositive motions are filed. 
Amendment of pleadings cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Moreover, plaintiff 
presented no justification for the delay in asserting the reformation claim. If the loan 
documents were truly signed under a mutual mistake of fact, i.e., that the Camillo Note 
was covered by the Trust Deed, then that mistake should reasonably have been apparent 
to plaintiff when the original complaint and answer were filed. An amendment would be 
plainly prejudicial because it would have the effect of starting the case all over again, 
with the attendant loss of time and expense. Accordingly, the district court was within its 
discretion in denying the amendment as untimely and prejudicial. 
Under established Utah law, amendment of a complaint may also properly be 
denied if the proposed amendment is futile or legally insufficient. An amendment that is 
legally insufficient, and thus subject to a motion to dismiss, serves no valid purpose and is 
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therefore properly denied as "futile." See, e.g., Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 
(Utah 1992) (proposed amendment denied as "fruitless"); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. 
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (amendment of complaint "should be 
denied" when the proposed claim is "legally insufficient or futile"). The district court 
properly denied plaintiffs proposed amendment, seeking to reform the Promissory Note 
and Trust Deed to secure the Camillo Note, as legally insufficient. 
Plaintiff relies on the equitable theory of mutual mistake, arguing that Tretheway 
and Nebeker intended the Trust Deed to secure the Camillo Note. (Br. of App. 14-16.) 
However, "mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain." Neiderhauser Builders andDev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 
App. 1992) (emp. added). The most common example is when the legal description in a 
deed erroneously fails to describe the property that both parties believed was being 
conveyed. See Graham v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 325 n.3 (Utah App. 1990). 
Reformation accomplishes equity by conforming the written instrument to the intent of all 
parties. Id. In the present case, however, there is no mutual mistake because defendant 
Furstenau never understood or intended that the Trust Deed would secure a debt of 
$203,400 rather than the face amount of $150,000. (R. 118-19, 212-13, Add. 51.) Absent 
such intent or understanding by all parties to the documents, there is no mutual mistake, 
and those documents cannot fairly be reformed contrary to his intent. See Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1390 (Utah 1996) (denying an amendment to reform a trust 
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deed to exclude certain property because the lender had no such intent). Accordingly, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed amendment as legally 
insufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court 
and remand the case for an award of the additional costs and attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this / / aav of March, 2001. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: £Z^C^^ 4^ ^%^7n 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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Third Judicial District 
MAR _ 2 2000 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 
2000, in connection with the plaintiff's and defendant Robert 
Furstenau's cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and 
informed counsel that they would be notified of the ruling by 
telephone. Upon further review of the moving and responding 
memoranda, the Court decided that a written ruling was warranted. 
Therefore, being fully advised of the facts in this matter and the 
applicable law, the Court rules as stated herein. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 1, 1999, the defendants signed a Promissory Note, 
promising to repay the plaintiff a $150,000 loan. The defendants 
also signed a Trust Deed, conveying two parcels of property, an 
00144 
a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the 
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded 
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a 
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB 
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in 
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01f East 
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North 
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING 
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date 
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of 
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed 
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents; 
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter in the amount of $13,261.80 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau 
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and 
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling. 
2 
n n 1 ^ :Ti 
TRETHEWAY V. FURSTENAU PAGE 5 COURT'S RULING 
Counsel for defendant Furstenau is to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Court's Ruling, specifically indicating that 
the plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants is dismissed. 
Dated this ™ day of March, 2CKJ0\ 
"LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the 
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded 
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a 
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB 
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in 
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0C01' East 
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02f East 345.00 feet; thence North 
89°45* West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING 
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date 
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of 
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed 
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents; 
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau 
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and 
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling. 
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ay—_ 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Merrill F.Nelson(#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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OF JUDGMENTS 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the 
Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908053 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 2000, on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed by 
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court 
hereby orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiff s Motion For Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part 
and denied in part as follows: Final J u d s m e n t @J 
niiiiiiiiiilil 
a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the 
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded 
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a 
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB 
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in 
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East 
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North 
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING 
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date 
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of 
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed 
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents; 
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter in the amount of $13,261.80 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau 
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and 
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling. 
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J . This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case. 
<> 0 *v£l 
Dated this ^ dayof March, 2000. 
Honorable\Leslie A. Lewis .". \\ 
District-Judge - —•'•*. -•-,.'-
llolofrf? 
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120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the 
Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908053 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 2000, on the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed by 
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court 
hereby orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part 
and denied in part as follows: 
0017? 
a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the 
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded 
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a 
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB 
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in 
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East 
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North 
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING 
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date 
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of 
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed 
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents; 
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau 
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and 
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling. 
? 
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3. This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case. 
Dated this day of April, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3 day of April, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Kenneth Parkinson 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
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i hird Judicial District 
MAY 2 h 2000 
SAW LAKE CpjJNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY/ trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU/ BLAIR NEBEKER/ 
U.P.N.L.C./ and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL/ INC./ 
a Nevada corporation/ 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with the plaintiff's 
Objection to Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Filing of Final 
Judgment. Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
The plaintiff's Objection is first directed towards the 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees filed by Mr. David M. Wahlquist, 
attorney for defendant Furstenau. The plaintiff contends that the 
Affidavit does not adequately describe the nature of services 
performed by Mr. Wahlquist. In response to the plaintiff's 
concerns, Mr. Wahlquist has filed a Revised Affidavit of David M. 
Wahlquist. The Court determines that the Revised Affidavit 
describes the services performed with sufficient specificity. The 
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Court therefore overrules the plaintiff's Objection with respect to 
the itemization of services. In addition, having reviewed the 
Revised Affidavit, the Court determines that the attorney's fees 
requested are reasonable and necessary, given the complexity of the 
issues involved and the need for counsel to review not only the 
parties' present dealings (and the documents involved), but also to 
consider and delve into the parties' prior dealings. Accordingly, 
the Court overrules the plaintiff's Objection. The attorney's fees 
sought are granted. 
Next, the plaintiff Objects to the fact that the Final 
Judgment is inconsistent, in declaring the Trust Deed void and 
still ordering the plaintiff to reconvey it within ten days. The 
Court agrees with defendant Furstenau that while reconveyance may 
technically be unnecessary, given the Court's ruling that the Trust 
Deed has no force or effect, it would nevertheless provide a 
definitive passage of the title free and clear of the Trust Deed. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Objection on this basis is overruled. 
Finally, the plaintiff objects to the Final Judgment because 
of an inconsistency between the amount of fees and costs specified 
in the Final Judgment and the amount set forth in Mr. Wahlquist's 
Affidavit. Defendant Furstenau recognizes this error and has 
furnished the Court with an Amended Final Judgment which accurately 
reflects the fees sought under the Revised Affidavit. The Court 
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sets aside the Final Judgment entered on March 22, 2000, and enters 
the Amended Final Judgment, which the Court executed on a date 
contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling. 
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, overruling 
the plaintiff's Objection in the entirety. 
Dated this (7* 'day of May, 2ac 
JESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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HAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this 2j day of May, 
2000: 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
12 0 East 3 00 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
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D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
KENNETH PARKINSON (6778), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
J:\kbp\treth.ntc 
Our File No. 25,213 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 990908053 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Plaintiff Sandra L. Tretheway hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court trom the 
district court's Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 24, 2000, and from 
all other adverse rulings in this case. 
DATED this 60 day of June, 2000. 
KENNETH PARKINSON for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, this 20 day of June, 2000, postage prepaid. 
David M. Wahlquist, Esq. 
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq. 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
S E P 21 ?ono 
eputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, 
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint. 
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31, 
2000. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter 
under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant 
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties. 
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an 
opportunity to consider or reconsider the law, all relevant 
pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case. Now being 
fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should 
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2 000, wherein the Court granted 
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
00245 
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According to the plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate 
because there are two issues of material fact which the Court 
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from 
being granted. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the 
Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed 
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the 
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two 
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved 
as a matter of law. 
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with 
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in 
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based 
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed. 
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it 
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note 
was not secured by the Trust Deed. Whether the Note was secured by 
the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the 
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's resolution of this legal issue in favor of defendant 
Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court 
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved, 
without regard to extrinsic evidence. The Court remains convinced 
of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there 
00246 
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in 
order for all of the Trust Property to be released. Accordingly, 
the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right, 
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion 
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of 
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise 
any new claims which appear to be legally viable. Specifically, 
the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this 
case because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual 
mistake. Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he 
never understood nor intended to sign a Note for $150,000, or 
actually be responsible for repaying $2 03,4 00, which represents the 
addition of an unrelated debt which is not the subject of the Note 
or the Trust Deed. (See Furstenau Affidavit). Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that the plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint is 
untimely and legally insufficient and therefore denies the Motion 
to Amend, in its discretion. 
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the plaintiff's Motions. No further Order in connection 
with these Motion will be necessary. 
Dated this 
S -n j* 
^LESLIE-/A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
nf)?AR 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this QI\ day of 
September, 2 000: 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 3 00 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant,Furstenau 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
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FILED DibfRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 0 4 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER, 
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 990908053 
Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, 
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint. 
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31, 
2 000. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter 
under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant 
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties. 
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an 
opportunity to consider or reconsider the law, all relevant 
pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case. Now being 
fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should 
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2000, wherein the Court granted 
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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According to the plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate 
because there are two issues of material fact which the Court 
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from 
being granted. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the 
Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed 
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the 
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two 
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved 
as a matter of law. 
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with 
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in 
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based 
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed. 
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it 
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note 
was not secured by the Trust Deed. Whether the Note was secured by 
the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the 
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's resolution of this legal issue in favor of defendant 
Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court 
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved, 
without regard to extrinsic evidence. The Court remains convinced 
of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there 
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in 
order for all of the Trust Property to be released. Accordingly, 
the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right, 
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion 
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of 
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise 
any new claims which appear to be legally viable. Specifically, 
the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this 
case because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual 
mistake. Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he 
understood and intended to sign a Note for $150,000, but not to be 
responsible for repaying or by signing any note agreeing to pay, 
$203,400, which represents the addition of an unrelated debt which 
is not the subject of the Note or the Trust Deed. (See Furstenau 
Affidavit). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's 
proposed Amended Complaint is untimely and legally insufficient and 
therefore denies the Motion to Amend, in its discretion. 
0025 
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the plaintiff's Motions. No further Order in connection 
with these Motion will be necessary. 
Dated this o 4 P day of September, 2000. 
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HAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this day of 
September, 2 000: 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
David Me Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
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D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and 
KENNETH PARKINSON (6778), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
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Our File No. 25,213 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of 
the Tretheway Family Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 990908053 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Plaintiff Sandra L. Tretheway hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the 
Court's Ruling dated September 25, 2000, from the ruling dated May 24, 2000, and from all 
other adverse rulings in this case. All rulings were made by the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. 
•si DATED this ^ - " d a y of October, 2000. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: . 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, this ^ ^ day of October, 2000, postage prepaid. 
David M. Wahlquist, Esq. 
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq. 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the 
Tretheway Family Trust, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: ROBERT FURSTENAU 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 990908053 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED : 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a : 
Nevada corporation, : 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Robert Furstenau, do hereby affirm and depose on oath as follows: 
1. On or about February 1,1999,1 signed a Promissory Note ("Note"), drafted by 
plaintiff, promising to repay to plaintiff a loan of $ 150,000. (Exh. 1.) 
2. On or about that same day, I also signed a Deed of Trust ("Trust Deed"), also drafted 
by plaintiff, for the purpose of securing payment of the Note. (Exh. 2.) 
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3. The property conveyed by the Trust Deed consists of two separate parcels, an 
apartment/condominium complex and a gas station, whose legal descriptions are set forth in the 
Exhibit A attached to the Trust Deed ("Trust Property"). 
4. On or about June 23, 1999,1 paid to plaintiff the full amount owing on the Note and 
requested reconveyance of the Trust Property. There has been no default in payment of the Note. 
(Exh. 3.) 
5. Plaintiff subsequently reconveyed the apartment/condominium complex, but refused, 
and still refuses, to reconvey the gas station until I pay an additional $53,400, plus interest, to 
satisfy a separate, unrelated note described as the "Camillo note." (Exh. 4.) 
6. The "Camillo note," referred to in the third release provision of the Note, is not 
secured by the Trust Deed, but by separate property described as Lot 16, Taylorsville Park 
Subdivision. (Exh. 5.) 
DATED t h i s 2 2 ^ day of August, 1999. 
Robert Fursten 
CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
On this of August, 1999, before me, a notary public, personally appeared ROBERT 
FURSTENAU, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or affirmed 
to me that his signature is voluntary and the document truthful. 
6&aammmummmmmmmmmmm 
NOTARY PUQUC 
WTRIC1A HARRIS 
5 1 2 5 * * * 2100 Sour* 
UftUfttCty.Utah 84120 
My Commdsion Expires: M 9 - 2 0 0 1 
State of Utah 
W:\60O0\6233\0003\MfnAfTFurstcnauPld.wpd 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this "ZTr^ day of August, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Kenneth Parkinson 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Jj£J^ 
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PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST 
BUSINESS LOAN 
Amount:$150,000.00 Salt Lake City , Ut. 
Interest Rate: IS* Date: February 1, 1999 
PARTIES: 
Lender: Sandra Tretheway, Trustee of the Tretheway Family 
Trust, dated May 9, 1991, whose residence and mailing address is 
2013 Spring Oaks Dr. Springvj.lle, Ut. 84563 and will'be referred to 
as "Lender". 
Borrowers: Blair Nebeker 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 84057 PHONE 001 558S777 
BOB FURSTENAU 
7579 S. MARY ESTER CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
U.P. N. L.C. 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 84057 PHONE 801 5585777 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC, A 
NEVADA CORPORATION 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 84057 PHONE 801 5585777 
BORROWER'S PROMISE: 
In return for a loan We have received of $150,0,00.00 
this amount will be called "principal") , BORROWERS promise to pay 
to the order of Lender, at the above address as follows: 
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST: 
BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the principal amount of 
the loan with interest at the rate of 15% per year until the full 
amount of the loan has been repaid-: Interest to commence the 1 day 
of FEBRUARY , 1999. The monthly payment of interest shall be made 
on the first day of each and every month commencing MARCH 1, IS)99 
which shall be the sum of $1875.00 per month on the first day of 
each month commencing March 1, 19 99 paid directly from Borrower to 
Lender. 
FULL PAYMENT: 
The unpaid balance of the LOAN and any unpaid interest 
shall be completely paid on or before August 1, 1999 
1 
Exhibit 1 
PREPAYMENT PENALTY: 
Even though BORROWER is not required to do so, BORROWER may 
make other payments to pay off the loan in addition to the payments 
described above without penalty. 
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS: 
Any payments BORROWERS make will be used first no pay the 
interest due on the loan, second to. pay any penalties and the 
balance shall be applied to the loan balance. 
IMMEDIATE PAYMENT: 
If BORROWERS fail to make any payments required by thir; 
Promissory Loan Note, the Lender will have the right to demand that 
BORROWERS immediately pay the full amount of the balance of the 
loan and any interest that We owe on that amount. 
Oix payments there is no grace period. The money to be in 
LENDERS POSSESSION on the due date. So long as the envelope is 
postmarked 4 days prior to the due date of the monthly payment it 
is deemed to arrive on time. If postmarked after 4 days or is not 
sent: to the correct address the date of delivery to lender is 
determined by actual delivery. Borrower in addition to all other 
penalties set forth herein shall pay $350.00 for each late payment 
on demand of Lender. 
In the event Borrower fails to make any two payments, 
consecutively or otherwise, when due, the interest rate goes to 
21% for all the past due payments and until three months three 
months payments are made when due<. When three consecutive months 
payments are made on time the interest drops back down to 15%. If 
not the penalty continues until three consecutive months have been 
paid on time. If there* are two late payments again at any time 
during the period of the loan the same applies again and the 21S? 
continues until the note is paid off. The 2l5r rate also becomes 
effective if the Borrower allows the property to go into 
foreclosure or the borrower goes into bankruptcy whether voluntary 
or involuntary. 
(The foregoing is not an extension of time to pay but is strictly 
a penalty provision to get borrower to pay on time. 
COLLECTION COSTS: 
If the Lender must hire an attorney to help collect any 
payments Borower required to make by this Promissory Loan Note, or 
to collect the unpaid loan principal and interest, Borrower agrees 
to pay the Lender's attorney a reasonable fee. If a lawsuit ir> 
filed to collect on this Promissory Loan Note, Borrower will also 
pay, in addition to a reasonable attorney's fee, the Lender's court 
2 
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costs. 
By signing this Note, everyone who has signed as a Borrower 
understands that ho or she could be held individually and 
personally responsible for repayment of the whole unpaid loan 
amount, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. That is, 
the Lender may collect the whole unpaid amount of the loan from any 
one of us without having to collect from any other signer. 
TRUST DEED 
IN THE EVENT OF FORECLOSURE OR HIE ADVANCEMENT OF ANY MONIES 
ANY AND ALL MONIES DUE UNDER THE NOTE PLUS ALL COSTS OF FORECLOSURE 
AND/OR ANY ADVANCES OF FUNDS MADE BY LENDERS TO PROTECT THE 
SECURITY OF THIS LOAN SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 2 0* PER 
ANNUM, NON COMPOUNDED. 
POINTS: 
Any points paid in advance "on account of this loan are 
considered premiums and shall not be applied to the reduction of 
principal or any interest payments. 
CONFLICT: If there is any conflict between the terms of this note 
and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the note are 
controlling. 
RELEASES: 
1. THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO OTHER SECURITY BY A 
SECOND TRUST DEED ON THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT "A" 
Lender -will give a partial release for each condominum sold upon 
the property upon the payment of the sum of $20,000.00 per 
condominimum eold to the Lender. 
2. Upon the payment of $15 0,000.0 0 to Lender and there has 
been no default in any of the payments by Borrowers to Lender the 
Trust Deed described in Exhibit: "A" shall be released. 
3. The first trust deed on the property described in Exhibit 
"B" attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the som of 
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the. Camillo 
note, now owned by Tipton Family Trust for the sum of $53,400.00 
plus interest in the sum of $5,696.00 which is interet due as of 
February 1, 1999 plus interest at the rate of $712,00 per month 
thereafter until paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul 
Halliday in the case of Dicamiilo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn 
Abbott. Upon payment of same Tipton shall assign the note and Deed 
of trust to Blair Nebeker along with any papers necessary to 
transfer the case to Nebeker and- make him the Plaintiff in paid 
case > 
3 
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Nebekcr will hold Tipton Family Trust free and harrales from any 
damages arising out of the Dicamillp note, 
"BORROWERS" 
Blair Nebeker 
1212 E, MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 84 
Z ^ ~ 
PHONE 801 5585777 
BOB FURSTENAU/ 
7579 S. T-1ARY E ^ E R ^ I R C L E 
SALT LAXE CITY, UTAH, 
1.E ^ ^ > 
U.P. N. L.C, 
1212 E. MOSS 
MIDVALE, UT. 84057 PHONE 801 5585777 
{n~. - Wb&&6fr 
ADVANCED PROPERTIES r^RNATIIONiL, INC, A 
MIDVALE, UT. 04057 PHONE 801 553577/ 
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ALTA P l a i n Language Coraoitrceriti 
ORDER NO, 490594 
DESCRIPTION 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB HEIGHTS, Plat "A", 
and running thence North 0°01' East 215.79 fest; tbance South 51*02• 
East 345 feel:; thence No^th 39°45f West, 268,31 feex to Che point o'r 
beginning. 
The above described property also known by the street address of; 
24S0 EAST PARLEYS W£Y, S 4 L T LfcXE CITY; UTAH 84109 
/> 
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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Sandra Tretheway, Trustee 
c/o Tretheway Law Offices 
2018 Spring Oaks Drive 
Springville, Utah 84663 
E-490594AW 
DEED OF TRUST 
^ W I T i l ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of Trust, made this _J day of February, 1999, between Blair Ncbeker, Bob Furstenau, 
U.P.N., L,C, and Advanced Property International, Inc., a Nevada corporation, as Trustor, whose address is 
JLg25£. £36P %>• SU^ICT foflO*! . FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation - Utah Division, as Trustee, and Sandra Tretheway, 
Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust, dated May 9, 1991, as Beneficiary, WITNESS: That Trustor 
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to trustee in trust, with power of sale, the following described property, 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
Sec Exhibit "A" attached and made a part hereof 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, 
rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now 
or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power 
an authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and 
profits. 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum 
of $150,000.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest 
as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each 
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may 
be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they 
are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiaiy under 
or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; lo complete or restore 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner nny building which mny be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply widi 
oil laws, covenants nnd restrictions affecting snid property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit nny act 
upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, 
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; und% if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the 
purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees; 
(a) To commence construction promptly nnd lo pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance 
with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect snid property at all limes during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation lo it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor under this 
numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true nnd conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the improvements now 
existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss 
payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiaiy. In the event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, 
who may make proof of loss, and each insurance company concerned is hereby auUiorized and directed (o make payment for such loss 
directly lo Beneficiaiy, instead of to Trustor and Beneficiaiy jointly, nnd die insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied by 
Beneficiary, at its option, to the reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to die restoration or repair of the property dumnged. In 
the event that die Trustor shall fail to provide satisfactory hazard insurance, the Beneficiaiy may procure, on the Trustor's behalf, insurance 
in favor of the Beneficiary alone. If insurance cannot, be secured by the Trustor to provide die required coverage, this will constitute an 
act of default under the terms of this Deed of Trust, 
3. To deliver to, pny for and rnnintnin willi Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence of tillc 
ns Beneficing may require, including attracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements 
thereto. 
4. To appear in nnd defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said propqly, or the rights 
or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; -and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay 
all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum inclined by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all (axes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon 
water company slock and nil rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said property; to pay, when 
due, nil encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at any lime appear to be prior or suj>erior 
hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. To pay to Beneficiary monthly, in advance an umount, as estimated by Beneficiary in its discretion, sufficient to pay all taxes 
and assessments alVecling said property, and nil premiums on insurance therefor, as nnd when the same shall become due. 
7. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act ns herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but wilhoul 
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may; Make 
or do die same in such manner and lo such cxlcnl as either may deem necessary to protect Ihe security hereof, Beneficiaiy or Trustee being 
authorized to enter upon said property for such puiposcs; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting lo affect 
the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiaiy or Tnislec; pay, purdia.se, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, ehnrgc or 
lien which in the judgment of cither appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend 
whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cosl of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay 
his reasonable ttcs. 
8. To pay immediately nnd without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiaiy or Trustee, wilh interest from date of 
expenditure at the rate of Fifteen Percent (15%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
9. To pay lo Beneficiary a "late charge" if any payment is not made on the payment dale in tiic amount of $350.00. Amounts in 
default shall bear intcresl at a rate of 2\9A per annum. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
10. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and odier 
payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option lo commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or 
proceedings, or lo make any compromise or .settlement, in coimeclion wilh such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, 
damages, rights of action and proceeds, moluding ihe proceeds of any policies offirc and oilier insurance affecting said property, are hereby 
assigned lo Beneficiaiy, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness 
secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and 
proceeds ns Beneficiaiy or Trustee may require. 
11. At any time and from time lo lime upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Deed of 
Trust and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention) wilhoul affecting Ihe liability of any person 
for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, and without releasing the interest of any party joining in this Deed of Tiust, Trustee 
may (a) consent lo the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any rcslriclion thereon; 
(c) join m any subordination or other agreement affecting Otis Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; (d) grant any extension or 
modification of the terms of litis loan; (c) reconvcy, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in nny reconveyance 
may be described as "the persons entitled thereto*, and the recitals therein of any mailers of facts shall be conclusive proof of the 
truthfulness thereof. Tmstor agrees lo pay reasonable trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
12. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns lo Beneficiary, during ihe continuance of these trusts, all rents, issues, royalties, 
and profils of Ihe property affected by this Deed of Trust and of nny personal property located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the 
payment of aiw indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have Ihe right to collect nil 
such rents, issues, royalties, and profils earned prior lo default ns they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustor's right lo collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, wilh or without taking possession of the 
property affected hereby, to collect all rents, loyalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiaiy at any time or from lime 
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any maimer affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, nnd 
authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiaiy to collect, shall be, or be construed 
lo be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor n subordination of die lien 
or charge of this Deed of Trust lo any such lennncy, lease or option. 
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, cither in person, by agent, or by a receiver 
lo be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiaiy as such receiver), and wilhoul regard lo the 
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and lake possession of said property or any part thereof, in its 
own name sue for or olhci-wi.se collect said rents, issues, and profils, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs 
and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order 
as Beneficiaiy may determine. 
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or tiie proceeds of 
fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or releusc 
thereof OS nforL'^nfH shrtll nnt PIUV n r t u n i w n..vr ,^.r f tnll A - n « l ^ « AM ,l..f....lt t , « r« . . ^ , l , r « - i . , ih, lM.I» „..,r «..# , l ^ « .».i^...,.nl {« c-iwli nnl lr .* 
15, The failure on the part of Beneficiary lo promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not opernte as a waiver of such right and 
the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default, 
1G. Tunc is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Bcncficiujy. 
In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee lo execute u written notice of default and of election lo cause said 
properly to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said properly or 
some pail or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures 
secured hereby. 
17. After the lapse of such lime as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of 
default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell said properly on the 
dale and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine 
(but subject to any statutory right of Trustor lo direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall 
be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Slates at the lime of sale. The 
person conducing the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from lime to lime until it shall be completed and, in 
every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person i\l the time and place last appointed 
for the sale; provided, if the sate is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated i" the notice of sale, notice thereof shall 
be given iw the same manner as die original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said 
property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts shall be 
conclusive proof of the tmllifulncss thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceed* of 
the sale to payment of (1) the cost and expenses of exercising die power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of die Trustee's and 
attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums 
expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 21°/o per annum from date of expenditure; (A) all other sums 
the secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may 
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
18. Trustor ngrecs lo surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property lo the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby 
immediately due and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the maimer provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real 
property end Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident lliercto, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any lime by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county 
in which said property or some pnit thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new 
trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such 
substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary* ahull 
mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, 
the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
22. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided 
by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding 
in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
. 1 his Dfeefl of Trust shall be construed according lo the laws of the Stale of Utah 
. Thcuirld' 
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24. eliiirl signed Trustor requests thai a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him 
&; he/iiribU fore set forlh. 
Name.' B. William Nebeker 
Its: Manager 
iJnal, Inc., a Nevada corporation 
Name: Blair Nebcker 
lis: President 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Couuly of 
On ihc jL^day ofWuaiy, 1999, A.D. personally before me Dlnir Ncbckcr, 
who being by mc duly sworn did say for himself that he is (he President of Advanced 
Property International, Inc., a Nevada corporation and that Ihc within and foregoing 
instrument WHS signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board 
of Directors and lite said Blair Nebeker acknowledged to me ihnl cor|X)j*ftlion executed the 
\aliClk I'.iXtt Notary Public ALISHAA.WHITE 
330 EASI 400 South 
5.AH Lnko Cily. Lflah 6<t t l 
My Commission Dpiros 
Scplembor2G.2000 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
) County of Salt Lake 
On the I ' day of February, 1999, personally appeared before mc, Blair Nebeker the 
er of die foregoing document who acknowledged to mc dial lie executed the same. 
Notary Public""" " 1 
ALISHAA.WHITE 
SfLak* City. Utah 84 m 
W/Ccmimfjston Expiry I 
- ^ S«Pt»nibef 25.2000 
^ - . ^
a i L °£U(ah_ I 
Notary Public 
STATEOFUTAII ) 
) County of Snlt Lake 
On Ihc J day of February, 1999, personally appeared before me, Bob Furstenou the 
signer ofUic foregoing document who acknowledged to mc thnt he executed die same. 
Notary Public 
ALISHAA.WHITE 
330 Ens! 400 Sculh 
Sail Lake Cify.Ulah 8 4 i l l 
My Commission Cxpiros 
5cpiatnbor 25. 2000 I 
STATEOFUTAII ) 
County of 
- - ^ 1 , ^ato_o£Utah^ J 
On the J _ day of Jurrmny, 1999, A.D. personally before mc D. William 
Nebeker, who being by me duly sworn did say for himself Ihnl he is the Monngcr of U.F.N. 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company and Ihnl die within ond foregoing instrument was 
signed on behalf of said limited liability company by authority of a Articles of Organization 
and the snid Li. Willi/im Nebeker ncknowledged lo mc thai limited liability company 
executed ihu same. 
. No^pTibTc"*" 
ALSHAA,WHITE 
2 r oC,t*w«'ie«ni 
Notary 
*&lumber 25. 2000 ' 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby lias been paid in Jul I) 
TO: TRUSTEE 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of die note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Twsl Deed. Said note 
together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby retjueslcd and diirctcd' 
on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other 
evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, nnd to rcconvey, 
without warranty, lo the parties designated by the tenns of said Trust Deed, all of the estate now held by you thereunder. 
DATED , 1 9 _ 
Mail reconveyance lo: 
EXHIBIT "A" 
AND 
Commencing at (he Souiiieast conver ofLot 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Salt Lake Qly Survey, in the dly of 
Salt Lake County of Salt Lake; SUAeofUfeh, and running thence North 54 feet; tlrcnce West 165 fed; 
llience South 54 feet; tlience Hast 165 foctlo die point of Commencement. 
Also, commencing at a point 54 &i North of (he Soutteast comer of Lot 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Salt 
Lake City Survey, and running th-nce North 28.5 feet; thence West 165 fed; thence Soulh 28.5 feet; 
tlience East 165 fed to the plxe of Commencement 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB HEIGHTS, Plat 
"A", and running thence North 0°01l East 215.79 feet; thence 
South 51°02f East 345 feet; thence North 89045' West, 268,31 
feet to the point of beginning. 
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Exhibit 3 
n n n r. n 
WH5M pECflRDfiD, MAIL TO: 
Suruly Tlib Agency 
W1 East 560Q South ilf 100 
Murray, UUh 241Q7 
n M 4 0 a 7 7 C / 
07/07/?? * H I Rl 1 3 -GO 
NANCY WORKMAN 
R£CCRCEHr SALT UJE CWKTTI 'JTAH 
CL^ SIY TITLE 
REC 5T:Z JWANSOX iC£?UTY - VI 
CO 
I> 
CO 
o 
SUBSTITUTION o f YRUSTEE and DEED OF RECOffl/EYAMCE ( P A W I A L ) 
SoniraTfbthcwsy, Tru:Ue of ihi Trstbcway Family Trwl dated May 5, T2S1rU rte Owner an* Holder :f the &£a 
is:u:cd by the Dead of Tru«lf dalad FqBru^ iry 1, 1393, rrptfa by 2Wr NihLor, Bab fvirrfenatf, U.P.N., l.C„ and 
Advancad Praporty Inlarnotionsl, Inc. «is Truster lo First Am«fiwn Title (nsufinsD Carnpsny 35 Trmioa, /or ilia 
toent cf Sand/a Trcthcway.Trwrott of tha Tramway Family Trust, foted May 9,139I uSencfi^ry, wlifpbDcfc'J 
of Trust wis ricorded In lha of fie* of th« CcUnly Racnrdtrof Sdt Ub* Caunty, I M , In Beck e 24a, Dt pags 4727, 
Eniry Wumbe/ 7241 flBS. recafrf«d dsio af Fobnury Tf 1939, KEAEBY wbsiJtuUs SurMy TIUo Acsncy BSTrusiec in 
Ifou sf the abo>/c r.oirai Truslcs under sifd D«td of Trail, 
SLcfiXy Till? AQurcyharabyaciipUia)dflppo!nlm:nU5Trv5t£Sond«r laid Durd of Trust oniwSuccejsa'TjvrUfl, 
pursuantto iht rarest o^»Jd Cwn• r Mil fkldor,Js0$ to^Y Wjjijfey, without W2;rin(y, to the perjan or persens 
oftlillad lhorclo, tho i r u s t ^ p s / ^ n o w fva i f iy"ifi / % s u « Oder's aid Trust Dead. 
Said Dttf d of Trusl coVcrVfaaJ properly situated In Salt Lskf County, Utah, desefftatf 33 fallow. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of LoC 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Sale Lake Cicy Survey, In the C 
of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and running ihonca North 54 feet; tbenco Wq$t 1 
feet; thence 5oulh 54 feet; thenoa East 165 feet to the point of commencement. 
AL50, commencing at a point 54 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 8, Block 55, Plat "A", 
Sail Lake City Sun/ey, and running thence North 23.5 feel; thence West 165 feet; thence South ' 
ZS.5 feet; thence East 165 feci to the place of commencement. 
SITUATE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the : 
Tretheway Family Trust, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: ROBERT FURSTENAU 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 990908053 
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED : 
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a : 
Nevada corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Robert Furstenau, do hereby affirm and depose on oath as follows: 
1. At the time I signed the $ 150,000 Promissory Note and Deed of Trust dated February 
1,1999,1 was not aware and had no knowledge of any so-called "Camillo" debt or note between 
Blair Nebeker and the Tretheway Family Trust. 
n n i l R 
2. I never agreed to "incorporate" the Camillo debt into the $150,000 Promissory Note. 
3. I never agreed to secure payment of the Camillo debt with the apartments and gas 
station described in Exhibit A to the Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was intended to secure 
only payment of the $150,000 loan. 
4. My understanding of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust was that the trust 
property would be reconveyed upon payment of the $150,000 loan. I was never informed, and 
never agreed to payment, of an additional loan. 
5. At the time I signed the Promissory Note, no exhibits were attached to the Note. I 
understood the "Exhibit A" referred to in the second release provision, on page 3 of the Note, to 
be the Exhibit A that was attached to the Deed of Trust. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1999. 
Robert F 
CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
On this J_r: day of October, 1999, before me, a notary public, personally appeared ROBERT 
FURSTENAU, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or affirmed 
to me that his signature is voluntary and the document truthful. 
( NOTARY PUBLIC 
V 
W:\6000\623 3\0OO3\Mfn AiTFurstenau 1 Pld. wpd N&MttftJ8UC 
PATRICIA HARRIS 
5l25W«st 2100 Sown, 
$ * U H i City. Utah 84 v. 
My CWMnfesKOT Expires. 1 - -
State off:-' 
Rule 3 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 456 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 
OF TRIAL COURTS 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken 
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by 
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but 
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which 
may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as 
well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the 
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice 
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof 
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A 
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If 
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name 
of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, 
joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the 
clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial 
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment 
of the required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a 
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy 
of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has 
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the 
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the 
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not 
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The desig- The rule is amended to make clear that the 
nation of parties is changed to conform to the mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-
designation of parties m the federal appellate appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
courts. of the filing and docketing fees. But for the 
87 REAL ESTATE 57-1-21 
(insert name), grantee, of (insert place of residence), 
for the sum of dollars, the following described tract 
of land in County, Utah, to wit: (here describe 
the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this 
(month/day/year). 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his 
heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together 
with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto 
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and 
personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the 
premises; tha t he has good right to convey the same; that he 
guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and assigns in the quiet 
possession thereof; that the premises are free from all encum-
brances; and tha t the grantor, his heirs, and personal repre-
sentatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in 
the grantee, his heirs, and assigns against all lawful claims 
whatsoever. Any exceptions to these covenants may be briefly 
inserted in the deed following the description of the land. 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed — JEffect. 
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the 
following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
. (here insert name), grantor, sof. (insert 
place of residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert 
name), grantee, of (here insert place of resi-
dence), for the sum of dollars, the following de-
scribed tract *of land in County, Utah, to 
wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this 
(month/day/year). 
A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall 
ave the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and 
state of the grantor in and to the premises therein described 
nd all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto be-
mging, at the date of the conveyance. 2000 
7-1-14. Form of mortgage — Effect. 
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following 
inn: 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby mortgages to 
(insert name), mortgagee, of (insert place of 
residence), for the sum of dollars, the following 
described tract of land in County, Utah, to wit: 
(here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebt-
edness (here state amount and form of indebtedness, 
maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom payable, and 
where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
on said premises, and the sum of dollars attorneys' 
fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this 
(month/day/year). 
^ mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the 
ect of a conveyance of the land therein described, together 
h all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto 
onging, to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns, and legal 
>resentatives, as security for the payment of the indebted-
>s thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of 
general warranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments 
levied and assessed upon the land described, during the 
continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous to the day 
appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and may be 
foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being made in 
any of the conditions thereof as to payment of either principal, 
interest, taxes, or assessments. 2000 
57-1-15. Effect of recording ass ignment of mortgage . 
The recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself 
considered notice of the assignment to the mortgagor, his 
heirs, or personal representatives so as to invalidate any 
payment made by them or either of them to the mortgagee. 
1988 
57-1-16 to 57-1-18. Repealed. 1988,1994 
57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise 
designated in a t rust deed as the person for whose benefit 
a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property 
by a t rus t deed as security for the performance of an 
obligation. 
(3) T r u s t deed" means a deed executed in conformity 
with Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real 
property to a t rustee in t rust to secure the performance of 
an obligation of the trustor or other person named in the 
deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real 
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in 
interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth 
in Section 57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed 
by the t rust deed. 1988 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes 
— Effect. 
Transfers in t rust of real property may be made to secure 
the performance of an obligation of the trustor or any other 
person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. All right, title, 
interest and claim in and to the t rust property acquired by the 
trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu-
tion of the t rus t deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for 
the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is 
conveyed in like manner as if acquired before execution of the 
t rust deed. 1961 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a t rust deed shall be: 
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 
7-1-103, or insurance company authorized to do busi-
ness in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United 
States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a t rus t 
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States; 
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company autho-
rized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(V) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation which is li-
censed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit 
Administration or its successor, 
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a 
t rust deed existing prior to the effective date of this 
chapter, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to 
tha t t rust deed. 
57-1-30 REAL ESTATE 90 
balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of 
the county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the 
balance, the trustee shall be discharged from all further 
responsibility and the clerk shall deposit the proceeds with the 
state treasurer subject to the order of the district court. 1997 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property bj ' trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, 
intended to be used, or suitable for use on the trust property 
and which are hypothecated to secure an obligation secured by 
a trust deed may be sold with the trust property, or any part 
thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this 
act. 1961 
57-1-31, Trust d e e d s — Default in performance of obli-
gations secured — Reinstatement — Cancel-
lation of recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any 
obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity 
date fixed in the obligation, become due or been declared due 
by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any 
obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the 
payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or by 
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the 
terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for 
insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in accordance 
with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or 
his successor in interest in the trust property or any part 
thereof or any other person having a subordinate lien or 
encumbrance of record thereon or any beneficiary under a 
subordinate t rust deed, at any time within three months of the 
filing for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the 
power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or 
his successor in interest the entire amount then due under the ' 
terms of the t rust deed (including costs and expenses actually 
incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, 
and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other 
than tha t portion of the principal as would not then be due had 
no default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore 
existing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore had or 
instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obliga-
tion and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and 
remain in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration 
had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in 
the manner provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his 
assignee, shall, on demand of an>7 person having an interest in 
the t rus t property, execute and deliver to him a request to the 
trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any 
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a 
period of 30 days after such demand, refuses to request the 
trustee to execute and deliver this cancellation is liable to the 
person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from 
this refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee 
or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed 
constitutes a cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a 
cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust deed 
is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is suffi-
cient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the 
following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed 
for record (month/day/year), and recorded in Book , 
Page — , Records of County, (or filed of record 
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry No , County), 
Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed 
by as trustor, in which is named as beneficiary and 
as trustee, and filed for record (month/day/year), 
and recorded in Book , Page , Records of County, (or 
filed of record (month/day/year), with recorder's entry 
No , County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 2000 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for 
which trust deed was given as security — 
Collection of costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a t rust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action 
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebt-
edness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for 
which such property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's 
and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an 
action under this section. 1985 
57-1-33. R e p e a l e d . 1994 
57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed. 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a t rust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance 
under Subsection (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to 
the trustee or the trustee's successor in interest the trust 
deed and the note or other evidence tha t the obligation 
securing the trust deed has been satisfied. 
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate 
the grantee as "the person or persons entitled thereto." 1995 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclo-
sure of trust deed — Limitation of actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a t rus t deed shall be 
made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be 
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the 
trust deed. 1961 
57-1-35. Trust deeds — Transfer of secured debts as 
transfer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a t rus t deed shall 
operate as a transfer of the security therefor. 1961 
57-1-36. Trust deeds — Instruments entitled to be re-
corded — Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a 
beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of default, 
trustee's deed, reconveyance of the t rust property, and any 
instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or waived 
as to priority, if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to 
be recorded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial 
interest in the t rus t deed does not in itself impart notice of the 
assignment to the trustor, his heirs or personal representa-
tives, so as to invalidate any payment made by any of them to 
the person holding the note, bond, or other instrument evi-
dencing the obligation by the trust deed. 1988 
49 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. 
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files 
the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his original 
answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to 
the action. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, 
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the 
third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party 
defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert 
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the 
plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against 
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff 
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim 
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon 
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and 
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed 
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the 
third-party defendant. 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a counterclaim is asserted 
against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under 
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 14(a) and (b), F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appellate jurisdiction. the ground that a claim for relief then exists 
Third party by defendant. against the third-party defendant, but on the 
—Grounds. ground tha t the third-party defendant "may be 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. liable" to the defendant in the principal action. 
Cited. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin,'689 P.2d 
, „ , . . , . .. 1344 (Utah 1984). 
A p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P. 54(b), ap-
 U n t i m e l m o t i o n t o a „ o w counterclaim. 
plies when the trial court orders a separate
 T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n 
Z A t e f ™ ' c r o^ s : c l . f i m> oounterdaim, or
 d e n ^ m o t i o n s t Q a U o w & c o u n t e r c l a i m a n d to 
third-party claim and failure to have the case ^ .
 t h i r d d e f e n d a n t s w h i c h w e r e 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
 C1 r 1 0 ,, «. , .i 
J _i.- L r i.i_ J. -± -n j filed 13 months after an answer to the com-
lssues and parties before that court, will de- i . , n, , , . i u r *i_ 
prive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an ?l?m} , w , a \ fil?d, a t n d ^ W e e k s b e f ° / e ^ 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 scheduled trial date, where reasons for the 
(Utah 1991) untimely motion were inadequate and where 
the parties failed to demonstrate that the 
Third party by defendant. court's denial of the motions resulted in preju-dice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 R2d 794 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). —Grounds . 
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor 
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 
defendant in the initial action does so, not on 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188 A-L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or 
et seq. indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. A.L.R.4th 338. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
Rule 15 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, Specifying the time therefor. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 15, KR.C.R 
Amendments. 
—Actual notice. 
—After pretrial order. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
——To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 
lb include damages. 
—Considerations. 
Prejudice. 
—Court's discretion. 
Abused. 
Not abused. 
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
—Following dismissal. 
—Late amendment. 
Day of trial. 
During or after trial. 
—Pro se petitions. 
—Reply amounting to amendment. 
—"Responsive pleading." 
—Substitution of parties. 
Amendment to conform to evidence. 
—Allowed. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
—Amendment unnecessary. 
Consent to try issue. 
Evidence supporting findings. 
Issue raised by complaint. 
—Construction of rule. 
—Defense not pleaded. 
Affirmative defense. 
Issue tried by parties. 
—Failure to object to evidence. 
—Issues not pleaded. 
Mutual mistake. 
—Jury instruction as amendment. 
—New cause of action. 
Child support. 
—New theory of recovery. 
—Not allowed. 
No consent to try issue. 
—Notice. 
—Prejudice. 
